Opinion  

'FCA expects scrupulous attention to managing conflicts of interest'

Abdulali Jiwaji

Abdulali Jiwaji

The Financial Conduct Authority recently announced that H2O Asset Management has agreed to pay €250mn (£212mn) to investors for “extremely serious” breaches relating to investments that they had been unable to access for four years.

A former star of the European investment sector, which managed more than €30bn at its peak, H20 was subject to savage criticism by the FCA for providing “false and misleading statements and documentation” including “fabricated records and minutes of meetings”. 

The saga goes back to June 2019 when the Financial Times first reported that H20 had substantial exposure to illiquid securities tied to the German entrepreneur Lars Windhorst.

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This led the FCA to launch an investigation into whether H2O had carried out proper due diligence on investments relating to companies that were owned or introduced by Windhorst. The estimated value of those investments in August 2020 totalled €1.64bn.

Media reports highlighting the close relationship between Windhorst and the French asset manager’s chief executive, Bruno Crastes, precipitated a large volume of redemptions across H2O funds.

In parallel with the FCA, the French financial markets authority, the AMF, also took steps, requiring H2O to suspend all subscriptions and redemptions in various funds due to significant exposure to valuation uncertainty.  

The enforcement action identified distinct breaches of FCA principles.

Firstly, the FCA had concerns that H2O failed to apply due skill, care and diligence in relation to investment decisions, entering into high risk, unlisted and illiquid investments without having appropriately considered their merits and risk.

There was also failure to comply with policies and procedures relating to gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, due diligence and record keeping. 

Secondly, there were failings in risk management systems, in policies and procedures for decision-making, appropriate governance arrangements, plus inadequate oversight, challenge and monitoring of the investment decision-making process.

Conflicts of interest also arose in failure to record gifts and hospitality provided by Windhorst to H2O staff and family members, which meant that activities that could have acted as an inducement to continue making investments with Windhorst were not properly overseen or challenged.

Third, H2O failed to be open and co-operative with the FCA. This involved H2O making false and misleading statements to the FCA in several areas, including: the levels of due diligence conducted on investments, provision of false documents to the FCA in relation to records and minutes of governance and oversight committee meetings, and failing to disclose and providing misleading information as to the extent of hospitality.

The FCA stated that it would have imposed a “substantial fine” for these breaches, but instead agreed that H2O would compensate investors with a €250mn payment.

In deciding whether to impose a penalty or issue a public censure, the FCA enjoys a wide discretion, according to the circumstances of each case. 

Factors that may influence its decision include:

  • whether or not deterrence may be effectively achieved through public censure;
  • if the person has made a profit or avoided a loss as a result of the breach – this may determine in favour of a financial penalty; and
  • whether steps have been taken to ensure that those who have suffered loss due to the breach are fully compensated for those losses – this may determine in favour of a public censure.

Here, the FCA weighed the factors in favour of a public censure. But the Collectif Porteurs association, representing 9,000 investors, says it considers the low level of reimbursement agreed by the FCA as “shocking” and suggests it is not the UK regulator’s place to determine what compensation they receive.